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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new approach to reasoning about action and change using nonmonotonic logic. The approach
is arrived at by applying Pearl's theory of causal networks to logical formalizations of temporal reasoning do-
mains. It handles complicated reasoning domains involving concurrent actions, actions with nondeterministic
eects, preconditions over several points in time, ramication/qualication constraints and causal chains of
events. Our theory comes in two versions: version S
0
that works for logical theories in which causal knowledge
is represented explicitly, and version I
0
that works for theories in which this is not the case. We show that
S
0
can be seen as a generalization and/or correction of most existing approaches that are explicitly based on
causation. Specically, we prove that on a large class of reasoning domains, S
0
is equivalent to McCain &
Turner's theory of Ramications and Qualications. For another large class of reasoning domains, S
0
turns
out to be equivalent to Baral & Gelfond's L
3
approach. We give examples of reasoning domains that fall
outside these classes and for which S
0
yields better results than either McCain & Turner's or Baral & Gelfond's
approach. We give strong arguments that S
0
and Lin's recent causal theory are equivalent on all reasoning
domains on which both are dened. For the causal approaches of Morgenstern & Stein, Gener, Haugh and
Lifschitz & Rabinov we again provide examples of reasoning domains that S
0
handles better than they do. We
also show that two of the most well-known non-causal approaches, namely Baker's account and `chronological
minimization with lter preferential entailment', can be reinterpreted as approximations of I
0
. In the case of
Baker we again give an equivalence theorem and a counterexample. We thus provide a reinterpretation in terms
of causal network theory of much of the work done in nonmonotonic temporal reasoning.
1991 Computing Reviews Classication System: I.2.3,I.2.4
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1. Introduction
Any approach to common-sense temporal reasoning must address the frame problem [24]: how can one
properly model the common sense intuition that most facts about the world tend to stay the same over
time, unless an action takes place that aects them? Formalizing this notion of inertia or persistence
has turned out to be a notoriously dicult problem to which numerous solutions have been proposed.
All these dierent approaches to formalizing persistence can be classied in a number of families; one
of the larger of these consists of those accounts in which causal knowledge (for example, of the form
`A causes B') is represented explicitly, either by a predicate or by extending the logic with a `causal'
connective or modal operator. We will call these approaches the causal ones (as opposed to the other,
non-causal approaches).
On the other hand, in recent years there have been a number of papers on the use of directed acyclic
graphs for the modeling of causal relations; the theory of these `causal networks' is successfully applied
in several domains [5, 6, 26, 27]. We will call the view on causation that is implied by these networks
`Pearl's account of Causation' as it is mainly associated with J. Pearl's writings.
In our work, we establish a clear connection between nonmonotonic temporal reasoning and Pearl's
account of causation. We apply Pearl's theory to arrive at a nonmonotonic logic that formalizes
persistence. It comes in two versions: the rst, model selection criterion S
0
, works for causal logical
2theories (i.e. theories in which causal knowledge is axiomatized explicitly). It selects only those models
of a theory that are subject to persistence, and it does so the way Pearl's theory prescribes that it
should be done. The second version, model selection criterion I
0
, rst infers what causes what in a
non-causal theory. It then uses the causal relations it found to select the models subject to persistence.
Practically all of this is done again simply by applying Pearl's ideas. Now S
0
can be formally compared
to the existing causal approaches to formalizing persistence, and I
0
can be compared to the non-causal
ones. We have proven that some recent causal and `action description language'-based approaches
are equivalent to various restrictions of S
0
{ specically, we proved an equivalence theorem stating
that, for a large, precisely dened class of reasoning domains, S
0
and McCain and Turner's approach
[21] permit exactly the same inferences. For another large class of reasoning domains, we proved
that S
0
is equivalent to Baral and Gelfond's approach based on the action description language L
3
(an extension of Lifschitz and Gelfond's well-known language A [3]; also, we have made an informal
comparison that makes clear that Lin's recent approach [19, 20] is largely identical to S
0
. We also
provide examples of reasoning domains for which S
0
is not equivalent to either McCain and Turner's
or Baral and Gelfond's approach, and for which it gives better results than these approaches do. For
the other existing causal approaches { specically, those of Morgenstern and Stein [25], Gener [7]
and Lifschitz, Haugh and Rabinov [11, 18] we give other, new examples of reasoning domains where
our approach gives better results than they do. For two popular non-causal approaches, we argue that
they can be interpreted as implementing an approximation of I
0
. For one of them, namely Baker's
approach [1, 4, 12], we actually prove this, again by an equivalence theorem and a counterexample.
Summarizing,
Our approach to nonmonotonic temporal reasoning can be seen as a generalization and/or
correction of most existing ones .
Moreover, the comparisons clearly show that most of the problems with existing approaches can be
interpreted as stemming from not treating causation the way it is treated in Pearl's theory.
1.1 Structure of this report
In this report we give an overview of our results on I
0
and S
0
. The report does not contain any proofs;
a longer report that contains these is in preparation.
We will now rst introduce our formalism. We then introduce our basic ideas (section 3) and show
how they are connected to Pearl's theory (section 4). This prepares our denition of I
0
and S
0
which is
given in section 5. We continue to give more details on S
0
(section 6) and I
0
(section 7). Sections 8,9
and 10 compare I
0
and S
0
to the many other existing approaches. We end the paper with some
concluding, somewhat more philosophical remarks. The paper is set up in a more or less modular
fashion: the reader mainly interested in S
0
may skip section 7 and section 10. If one is only concerned
about I
0
, it is possible to skip section 6 and section 9.
2. Our Formalism
We use a many-sorted rst order logic. The sorts in our logic are generalized uents (variables of
the sort will be denoted by g) and timepoints (t). There are two `subsorts' to generalized uents:
regular uents (f) and event uents (e). A regular uent denotes a property of the world that
may be subject to persistence; an event uent stands for an event or action. The set of regular
uent constants for our language will be called FC; it will always be nite: FC = fF
1
; : : : ; F
jFCj
g.
Similarly, the set EC = fE
1
; : : : ; E
jECj
g contains our event uent constants. Time-points will be
equated to the nonnegative integers; additionally, our language contains a nite set of time name
constants TNC = fT
1
; : : : ; T
jTNCj
g that will enable us to have names for some of our points in time.
The predicate Ho(g; t) will denote that generalized uent g is the case (`Holds') at time t. e; f ;g and
t will be used as meta-variables that can stand for any ground term of the sort indicated by the letter.
32.1 Causal and Non-Causal Theories
We formalize our domain knowledge in two dierent manners: non-causal theories T
nc
, which are
intended to formalize knowledge essentially in the same way as most existing non-causal approaches
do, and causal theories T
c
, which are intended to do this essentially in the same way as most existing
causal approaches do. We will use a variation of the Yale Shooting Domain [10] to illustrate both of
them. In this domain there is a person that can be alive or not; there is a gun that can be loaded or
not; there is an action `load' which loads the gun, an action `wait' which has no eects at all and an
action `shoot', which, if performed when the gun is loaded, causes the person not to be alive anymore.
We further suppose that the person is alive and that the gun is unloaded at time t = 0, and that,
starting at time t = 0, someone rst loads the gun, then waits and then shoots. We will rst show
our non-causal formalization T
ysp-nc
of this domain. It contains axioms (1)-(8) :
Ho(Load; t)  Ho(Loaded; t+ 1) (1)
Ho(Loaded; t) ^ Ho(Shoot; t)  :Ho(Alive; t+ 1) (2)
Ho(Alive; 0) ^ :Ho(Loaded; 0) (3)
Ho(Load; 0) ^ Ho(Wait; 1) ^ Ho(Shoot; 2) (4)
Here Alive and Loaded are regular uents, while Load,Wait and Shoot are event uents. (1) and (2)
are the eect axioms which describe the `action laws' of our domain. (3) and (4) are our observation
axioms which are always propositional combinations of uent facts. The latter are dened to be
instances of Ho that contain no variables. Our language further contains a function Not mapping
event uents to event uents and regular uents to regular uents. It occurs in the following two
domain independent axioms that will be included in any T
nc
:
Ho(g; t)  :Ho(Not(g); t) (5)
Not(Not(g)) = g (6)
The restriction of a T
nc
to its domain independent axioms will be called T
nc
c
ind
. The eect
axioms together with T
nc
c
ind
will be called T
nc
c
gen
(the general axioms of a T
nc
). For each
T
nc
, T
nc
c
ind
further contains unique-names axioms [22]: for all F
1
; F
2
2 FC, F
1
6= F
2
we have:
F
1
6= F
2
(7)
For all E
1
; E
2
2 EC, E
1
6= E
2
we have:
E
1
6= E
2
(8)
2.2 Causal Theories
Causal and non-causal theories share the same domain-independent axioms: T
c
c
ind
= T
nc
c
ind
=
(5)-(8). Thus they are also part of our causal formalization of the shooting domain, T
ysp-c
. T
ysp-c
also contains observation axioms (3) and (4). General axioms (1) and (2) however will be replaced by
the following two axioms that make use of an additional predicate Ca(g; t) denoting that g is Caused
to hold at time t:
Ho(Load; t)  Ca(Loaded; t+ 1) (9)
Ho(Loaded; t) ^ Ho(Shoot; t)  Ca(Not(Alive); t+ 1) (10)
2.3 On Models
We denote by Mod(T ) the class of those classical models for any T in which timepoints are interpreted
as the nonnegative integers. If two models M
1
and M
2
share the same interpretation of Ho - which
means that they model exactly the same `history' or `development' of the domain under consideration -
we will sayM
1
andM
2
correspond in terms of Ho, written asM
1

Ho
M
2
. Formally,M
1

Ho
M
2
i for all g; t we have M
1
j= Ho(g; t),M
2
j= Ho(g; t)
4Loaded
  t
Loaded
t-1
Load
   t-1   t-1
  t
Alive
Alive
Shoot
   t-1
Figure 1: A Yale Shooting Causal Graph
3. Our Two Basic Ideas
The originally proposed method to formalize persistence was to select those models of a theory in
which the least changes of uent values occur [10, 23]. The YSP paper then showed that this method
does not work well. One of the rst proposed solutions [11, 17] to the YSP was to rene the original
model selection criterion to select only the models with the least uncaused changes. Indeed, all existing
causal approaches [7, 11, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25] implement some variation of this idea. In our own approach
we will rene this idea by connecting causation to explanation: informally, if A causes B, then A also
provides an explanation for B. But in domains subject to persistence, we may also say that if we
have Ho(f; t) for some regular uent f and nothing happens between t and t + 1, then this explains
Ho(f; t+ 1) just as well. This leads us to the two key ideas behind our approach:
Basic Principle From among the classical models, select those with the least (in the subset sense)
unexplained uent facts.
Preliminary Work We must correctly determine for each uent fact in each model whether it is
explained or not.
Intuitively, something is `explained' in a model if it is normally (`by default') the case given the rest
of the model. Thus nonmonotonic model selection becomes an abductive `search for explanations'
consisting of two stages: rst, the `preliminary work' is done to nd out what is explained in each
model; second, this is used to nd the models in which as much as possible is explained, i.e. the
models which are the least surprising. Now the rst stage is where Pearl's account of causation comes
in { we use it to do our `preliminary work'.
4. Pearl's Account of Causation
Here we will only treat Pearl's theory in a very informal manner, specically geared to enable us
to quickly introduce I
0
and S
0
. Given a domain with some variables, Pearl's theory uses `causal
graphs' to depict which variables have causal relationships to each other and which direction these
relationships take. A causal graph G together with a description D of the functional relations between
its variables is called a causal network (G;D). In order to give a rough idea of how this works, g. 1
gives a causal graph of the YSP domain. For example, it shows that (performing) a Load-action at
time t  1 has a causal inuence on (whether we have) Loaded at time t. Also, Loaded at time t   1
has a causal inuence, but of a dierent kind, on Loaded at time t. The parents of a node (connected
by either dashed or solid arrows) in the network are called its `direct causes'. Here is the fundamental
idea of Pearl's theory [5]:
5The Sucient Cause Principle If an action that sets the truth value of a proposition P is
performed successfully, then the truth values of all propositions in the causal network that are not
descendants of P become independent of P .
In graphical terms this means that we delete all arrows of variables going into the node that represents
P . In our example: normally, Ho(Loaded; t) implies Ho(Loaded; t 1). But if a Load-action takes place
at t  1, then Ho(Loaded; t) does not tell us anything anymore on whether we had Ho(Loaded; t  1).
Pearl's theory also tells us that for every causal network (G;D) the functions in D must be such that
the following principle holds [6], which for example makes sure that there are no dependencies between
variables which are not connected by any path in the graph:
The Causal Independence Principle Once all unexplainable facts and the direct causes of a
proposition P are known, the truth value of P becomes independent of all propositions in the causal
network that are not descendants of P .
5. Model Selection Criteria I
0
and S
0
In the following, we assume that T
nc
's are dened for a language that also contains the Ca-predicate
and a new predicate JE (`Just Explained' - the name will become clear later). But T
nc
's themselves
never contain axioms about either Ca or JE.
I
0
is dened on the next page as a ve-step procedure that receives as input a theory T
nc
and
that outputs a set of models I
0
(T
nc
)  Mod(T
nc
). Steps 1-4 of I
0
implement our `preliminary
work' (section 3). Step 5 uses the results of steps 1-4 to apply our `basic principle' (section 3). The
`preliminary work' can further be decomposed into two stages: in the rst stage (steps 1-3 in denition
1), I
0
will build a complete causal network for T
nc
. It will do this by using Pearl's theory and some
precisely stated additional assumptions about the `physics' of the domain under consideration. This
is meant in the following sense: given theory T
nc
and the additional assumptions, there is only one
specic causal network for T
nc
which does not contradict the properties that causal networks must
have according to Pearl's theory. In the second stage (step 4 in the denition), I
0
will apply Pearl's
semantics to the causal network found to determine for each uent fact in each model whether it is
explained or not.
This means that steps 1-3 (i.e. the rst stage) should not rule out any particular interpretation
of Ho; rather, they will determine for each interpretation of Ho a single interpretation of Ca and
JE belonging to it. This interpretation of Ca and JE encodes a causal graph in the following sense:
if, after performing the rst stage of I
0
, we have Ca(g; t) in a model this will mean that there is a
sucient cause for the uent g to hold at time t in the model (i.e. there is an action that successfully
makes g true); in graphical terms, there is a dashed arrow pointing into node (g; t). JE(g; t) in a
model will mean that there is a causal inuence on g which, if no intervention takes place would
normally make it hold at time t; graphically, a solid arrow points into (g; t). We will now go through
the ve steps of denition 1 in detail, using the YSP as an example as we go along .
Step 1 Here we determine the causal relations that hold in T
nc
. This is the most complicated step
by far, and for the time being we will content ourselves by explaining the outcome of this step: after
step 1, a modelM withM j= Ca(g; t) will be selected if there is a sucient cause within the model for
g to hold at t. For example, for T
ysp-nc
, all models remaining after step 1 will have Ca(Loaded; 1).
Also, among all models for T
ysp-nc
with Ho(Loaded; 2) all those selected in step 1 will also have
Ca(Not(Alive); 3). A detailed explanation of how step 1 works follows in section 7 .
Step 2 introduces persistence; if something holds at time t, there will be an explanation for it to
hold at time t + 1 (condition 1). Condition 2 expresses that if something holds at time t = 0, our
initial point in time, then it is explained anyway, independent of any other uent fact. Condition 3
makes sure that `normally we do not expect events to happen'. For example, in T
ysp-nc
, all models
6further selected will have JE(Not(Shoot); 2). Among all models for T
ysp-nc
with Ho(Alive; 2), those
further selected will also have JE(Alive; 3).
Step 3 We have determined in step 1-2 all places in the causal graph where there must be a causal
inuence and we must have an arrow. Step 3 embodies a domain closure of Ca and JE. It eectively
minimizes the interpretations of Ca and JE for every interpretation of Ho, while it does not rule out
any interpretation of Ho itself. This closure follows from the physical assumption that T
nc
c
gen
and
the persistence assumption of step 2 of I
0
are all the laws of nature to which our domain is subjected.
Also, this step forces the functional relations between the variables in the domain to obey Pearl's
principle of causal independence (sec.4)!
In T
ysp-nc
, all models further selected will have 8t::Ca(Alive; t). Also, among those models in I
0;2
that have Ho(Alive; 2), all those further selected will also have :JE (Not(Alive)) ; 3) .
Step 4 We now use Pearl's sucient cause principle to determine for each model M the set of
unexplained uent facts Ab
1
g
(M);Ab
2
f
(M);Ab
2
e
(M) - rst, a uent fact (g; t) in a model M is
unexplained (i.e. (g; t) 2 Ab
1
g
(M)) i there is a sucient cause for (g; t) in the model, while (g; t)
does not hold; i.e. an action has not had its regular eect. Regular uent fact (f ; t) is in Ab
2
f
(M)
if a) there is an explanation for it not to hold, b) there is no sucient cause for it to hold (i.e.
the sucient cause principle does not apply), but c) in fact, it does hold. This means there is an
unexplained breach of persistence. Event uent fact (e; t) is in Ab
2
e
(M) if event e takes place at
time t without being caused by something else in the model. Ca always overrules JE: if we have
JE(Alive; 3) but Ca(Not(Alive); 3) in all models, we prefer models with Ho(Not(Alive); 3): Alive was
`just' explained, Not(Alive) had a sucient cause.
The intended modelM of T
ysp-nc
will have emptyAb
1
g
(M) and emptyAb
2
f
(M), whileAb
2
e
(M) =
f(Load; 0); (Wait; 1); (Shoot; 2)g. The modelsM
0
in which the gun gets unloaded at t = 1 will all have
(Not(Loaded); 2) 2 Ab
2
f
(M
0
) .
Step 5 We rst select the models with the least violations of causal laws; we then further select those
with the least breaches of persistence. Finally, we rule out as many unexplained events as possible.
We perform this step as the latest because we regard unexplained events as less `surprising' than
unexplained breaches of persistence. In all selected models for T
ysp-nc
, we have :Ho(Alive; 3), so we
solve the YSP.
5.1 And what about S
0
?
Reconsider a causal theory such as our T
ysp-c
. From a Pearlian viewpoint, we can see that what is
actually formalized by axioms like (9) and (10) are the sucient causes for uents to hold at some
time. This means that what S
0
really must do is to perform steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 of I
0
as step 1 has
already been done by the person who formalized the domain knowledge! A formal denition can be
found in the box (def. 2).
6. More About S
0
Here we will briey show how S
0
handles some of the well-known problems in nonmonotonic temporal
reasoning: ramications and actions with non-deterministic eects. We will see in section 9.1 how S
0
handles causal chains of events.
6.1 Ramications
We may enhance the class of reasoning domains expressible in our language by introducing another
kind of axiom: constraint axioms that impose further restrictions on what may hold at what time in
our domains. As rst noticed by Ginsberg, [16] sometimes such a constraint axiom is meant to yield
indirect eects (ramications) while sometimes it should yield action preconditions (qualications).
7Denition 1 The model selection criterion I
0
from theories T
nc
to sets of models M 
Mod(T
nc
) is dened by the following procedure:
Step 1 Perform the following two sub-steps:
1. First derive `what causes what' in T
nc
using the procedure of denition 3 (next page).
2. Now select a model M2 Mod(T
nc
) i for all ;  ; (as in def. 3) we have that
if M j=  ^ 
and  s causes  under circumstances 
then M j= Ca(g
 
; t
 
)
Let I
0;1
be the set of models thus selected.
Step 2 Among the remaining models M2 I
0;1
, we select exactly those M with
1) M j= 8f; t: Ho(f; t)  JE(f; t+ 1) and
2) M j= 8f: JE(f; 0)  Ho(f; 0) and
3) M j= 8e; t: JE(Not(e); t).
Let the set of resulting M be I
0;2
.
Step 3 Further select any M2 I
0;2
i M has a minimal extension of Ca within
fM
0
j M
0
2 I
0;2
and M
Ho
M
0
g
and M has a minimal extension of JE within
fM
0
j M
0
2 I
0;2
and M
Ho
M
0
g
Let the set of remaining models be I
0;3
.
Step 4 We determine for each model M2 I
0;3
the set of unexplained uent facts:
Ab
1
g
(M) = f(g; t)jM j= :Ho(g; t) ^ Ca(g; t)g
Ab
2
f
(M) = f(f ; t)jM j= JE(Not(f); t) ^ Ho(f ; t) ^ :Ca(f ; t)g
Ab
2
e
(M) = f(e; t)jM j= JE(Not(e); t) ^ Ho(e; t) ^ :Ca(e; t)g
Step 5 Perform the following steps in order:
1. Select any M 2 I
0;3
i Ab
1
g
(M) is minimal over I
0;3
, i.e.. for no M
0
2 I
0;3
, Ab
1
g
(M
0
)
is a proper subset of Ab
1
g
(M) . Let the set of remaining models be I
0;4
.
2. Select any M 2 I
0;4
i Ab
2
f
(M) is minimal over I
0;4
. Let the set of remaining M be
I
0;5
.
3. Select any M2 I
0;5
i Ab
2
e
(M) is minimal over I
0;5
.
I
0
(T
nc
) is now dened to be the set of models remaining after step 5.3.
Denition 2 S
0
is the procedure that results from setting I
0;1
:= Mod(T
c
) and jumping into the
procedure of I
0
at the beginning of step 2.
8We will now give an example (inspired by McCain & Turner [21]). Let T
ysp-cr
be the union of
T
ysp-c
and the following two axioms:
:Ho(Alive; t)  Ca(Not(Walking); t) (11)
Ho(Get up; t)  Ca(Walking; t+ 1) (12)
Here (12) is another eect axiom, while (11) is a constraint axiom. (11) makes sure that in all selected
models for the T
ysp-cr
we have Ho(Walking; t)  Ho(Alive; t) while we do not necessarily have
Ho( Walking; t)  Ca(Alive; t). This means that Ho(Not(Alive); t) would block performing Get up
at time t: the reader may check that any M with Ho(Get up; t) ^Ho(Not(Alive); t) would have the
abnormality (Alive; t+1) 2 Ab
2
f
(M). On the other hand, Ho(Walking; t) can never block performing
a Shoot-action at time t: we have models M for T
ysp-cr
with M j= Ho(Walking; t) ^Ho(Alive; t) ^
Ho(Shoot; t) but without any abnormalities.
It is easy to show that S
0
also deals properly with `pure' ramication and qualication constraints
and with ramication constraints involving several preconditions (as in the `Emperor Problem' and
the `Two Switches Problem' [21] ).
6.2 Nondeterministic Eects
If we toss a coin, we would like to infer that after the Toss event, we can have either Heads or
Not(Heads), independent of whether we had Heads or Not(Heads) before the tossing (thus there is no
persistence). This can be expressed by the following axiom :
Ho(Toss; t)  [Ca(Heads; t+ 1)  :Ca(Not(Heads); t+ 1)]
In this way, if there is Toss-event at time t, then in all selected models there will either be a cause
for Heads but not Not(Heads) to hold, or for Not(Heads) but not Heads, but there never is a cause
for both (which would inevitably lead to an abnormality) or neither (which would let the old value
of Heads persist). Note that this is a way of directly representing nondeterministic eects and thus
considerably simpler than most earlier approaches to this problem [29], in which Toss is interpreted
as a set of deterministic actions Toss
1
with eect Heads and Toss
2
with eect Not(Heads) .
7. More About I
0
In this section we explain step 1 of I
0
in more detail. We need to nd out for each (g; t) in each
model whether there is a sucient cause for it in the same model. We will do this by rst generating
the causal laws that must minimally hold in all models of our theory T
nc
. To nd them, we need to
temporarily restrict it to T
nc
c
gen
{ we will see that we must not let our general causal relations be
inuenced by contingent observations! We see in denition 3 that we can infer
 s causes  under circumstances  (s-causes is to be read as `is a sucient cause of') if, given
that  holds,  always implies  (step 1 of denition 3) and (step 2), that  is actually brought about
by . Step 3 in denition 3 tells us that the causal inuence only goes one way. Steps 1, 2 and 3
are necessary if we want our causal relations to stand for causal networks in Pearl's sense { steps 1
and 2 follow from the sucient cause principle, step 3 from the directedness of the causal graph! We
can never be sure that  is a sucient cause for  by step 1 alone;  could then still `cause'  in
the models with 	 if 	 implied both  and  . Step 2 rules out this possibility. Step 4 adds another
assumption about the physics of our domains, which simply says that performing an action at time t
can never change anything about the world at an earlier point in time t
0
.
For example, in T
ysp-nc
we will get `Ho(Shoot; 2) s-causes Ho(Not(Alive) ; 3) u.c. Ho(Loaded; 2)'.
Now consider what would have happened if we had not restricted ourselves to T
nc
c
gen
: we would
have had Ho(Shoot; 2) in all models; therefore we could never have checked whether it is really the
shooting that brought about Not(Alive). For this, we need to be able to look at a counterfactual
model M
c
where no shooting takes place at time 2! We must then check whether a) we can have
Ho(Alive; 3) in M
c
(step 2), and b) whether, in all models with Ho(Shoot; 2) and Ho(Loaded; 2), we
must have Ho(Not(Alive); 3) (step 1) .
9Denition 3 Suppose a theory T
nc
is given. LetM
gen
= Mod(T
nc
c
gen
). Let  = Ho(e

; t

),
 = Ho(g
 
; t
 
) be any (event and generalized, respectively) uent facts, and  be any propositional
combination of uent facts. We say that  s causes  under circumstances  i all of the
following hold :
1. For all M2M
gen
: M j= )M j=    .
2. There is an M2M
gen
with M j=  ^ .
There also exists a `counterfactual model' M
c
2M
gen
of M w.r.t. ;  and ,
i.e. M
c
j=  ^ : ^ : .
3. There exists an M2M
gen
with M j=  ^ : ^  .
4. For all time points t

occurring in : t

 t

< t
 
.
8. Comparisons of S
0
and I
0
- the Harvest
We will now compare S
0
and I
0
to various existing approaches. We rst compare S
0
to existing causal
and Action-Description-Language (ADL) approaches (section (9). In section 10 we compare I
0
to two
non-causal approaches, i.e. Baker's method and `chronological minimization'.
We feature two kinds of comparisons. The rst kind is the `equivalence proof'. We have dened
several `correspondence relations' , such that T
A
 T
B
i domain descriptions T
A
of approach A
and T
B
of approach B intuitively encode the same domain knowledge. All approaches we considered
have as their basic objects regular uents and events; proving that A and B are equivalent then
amounts to showing that for all corresponding theories T
A
and T
B
(i.e. T
A
 T
B
) we have that
approach A selects a model M
A
with a particular history of what generalized uents hold at what
time i B selects a modelM
B
with the same interpretation of uent-time pairs. We will say that such
models semantically correspond, written as M
A

=
M
B
. Since for many well-formed theories of both
approaches,  will not be dened,  implicitly imposes constraints on the class of reasoning domains
for which the equivalence holds .
The second kind of comparison will always be an example of a simple reasoning domain for which
we claim that our approach works better than the one we are comparing it to.
The General Pattern For all our examples it turns out that if an approach behaves badly on
them, this is always either because our `basic principle' is violated (the approach does not or not
only select the least surprising models) or because our `preliminary work' is not done well (what is
explained and what is not is determined in a way not consistent with causal network theory).
9. S
0
and the others
9.1 Causal Model Selection Criteria
MAT The philosophy behind Motivated Action Theory (MAT) [25] is quite similar to ours: while
they prefer models with the least number of `unmotivated actions', we prefer those with the least
number of `uncaused events'. However, if one looks at the formal denitions, it turns out that in
the MAT model preference criterion a model M
1
is preferable over another model M
2
if all events
occurring in M
1
that do not occur in M
2
are motivated (i.e. have a cause within the model). This
means that if in two models the same events happen at the same time, the MAT criterion does not
reject the one in which there is less `motivation' for these events in terms of (regular) uent values,
and thus MAT violates our basic principle. This is illustrated in the following example for a reasoning
domain involving persons A and B. Person A can be Steady or not, can Fall or not, and can lie
10
On Floor or not. Person B can Push or not. We present the domain axioms in our language here but
the translation into MAT is straightforward.
Ho(Fall; t)  Ca(On Floor; t+ 1)
[:Ho(Steady; t) ^ Ho(Push; t)]  Ca(Fall; t+ 1)
Ho(Push; 0) ^ :Ho(On Floor; 1) ^Ho(On Floor; 2)
In this case, both approaches will yield the models in which :Ho(Steady; 0) ^ Ho(Fall; 1). But whereas
for our approach these are the only ones, MAT also selects the models with Ho(Steady; 0)^Ho(Fall; 1)!
We add here without going into detail that Gener's causal model selection [7] also gives the
unintended model in the example above.
9.2 ADL Approaches
From our point of view, both the recent ADL approaches and Sandewall's `systematic' approach [28]
are to be classied among the causal approaches, since they too, are based on explicitly distinguishing
between what is caused to hold and what actually holds in a model (though the word `caused' is
not always employed). Next we compare S
0
to two ADL approaches: Baral and Gelfond's L
3
[3]
and McCain and Turner's [21] Theory of Ramications and Qualications. L
3
is an extension of
the well-known language A [8] that can deal with concurrent actions, incomplete specication of
actions and incomplete knowledge on the order of the observations in time; it cannot at all deal with
ramications. McCain and Turner (MT)'s approach however is specically geared to handle these,
but cannot handle the other domains mentioned for L
3
. Our comparisons thus cover a rather wide
area of problem domains.
McCain and Turner's approach and S
0
MT consider theories that are triplets (S;E;C), dened for a propositional language where each atom
stands for a (regular) uent. The `state of the world' S is an interpretation for all uents, denoted
by a maximal consistent set of literals. E is a set of `explicit eects', i.e. propositional combinations
of uents. Intuitively, they are the formulas that are explicitly caused to hold by some (unspecied)
action. C is a set of `causal determination relations' that determine the ramications of eects. MT
dene a function Res
4
C
(E; S) such that it gives the set of possible states of the world after an action
with eects E has taken place in state S. For the denition of Res
4
C
(E; S) we refer to [21]; here we
just give an example of its use :
S = fAlive;Walkingg
E = f:Aliveg
C = f:Alive) :Walkingg
In this case, Res
4
C
(E; S) = ff:Alive;:Walkinggg i.e. the change of Alive brought about a change
of Walking. However, if we had had S
0
= f:Alive;:Walkingg, E
0
= fWalkingg, C
0
= C, then
Res
4
C
0
(E
0
; S
0
) would have been empty: `)' has a function similar to our `Ca', enabling changes of
right-hand side uent values given changes of left-hand side values, but not the other way around
(compare this to section 6.1). There is one sort of domain constraint that can be expressed in MT's
approach but not in ours: MT allow eects to be any propositional combination of uents, and thus an
eect (i.e. something which is Caused) may be a disjunction of two uents. This cannot be expressed
by theories T
c
(notice that a caused disjunction is not the same as a disjunction of instances of Ca).
But it is exactly here that MT can give counterintuitive results; to see this, consider the following
domain about a person that may or may not have a) the ue, b) a headache, c) nausea. If she catches
the ue, she will also get either a headache or nausea. Suppose that two events happen, one causing
the ue and the other causing a headache :
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S
2
= f:Flue;:Headache;:Nauseag
E
2
= fFlue;Headacheg
C
2
= fFlue) (Headache _Nausea)g
Proposition 1 Res
4
C
2
(E
2
; S
2
) = ffFlue;Headache;:Nauseagg
Proof: Follows directly from denition 4 in [21]. 2
We have the rather unintuitive conclusion that our patient is guaranteed not to get any nausea!
Assuming that an additional event happened which directly causes a headache allows us to rule out
the possibility of the person getting nauseous. We would say that our preliminary work (section 3) is
violated here - according to the sucient cause principle of causal network theory, an eect causing
Headache _ Nausea would mean that the value of `Headache _ Nausea' would become true, and also,
more importantly, the fact whether we have Headache or Nausea after the eect would not depend
anymore on whether Headache and/or Nausea held before the eect. The problem with the example
above then cannot occur any more. We have not extended our own approach to represent causes of
disjunctions as it does not seem to be of too much practical importance.
Apart from causes of disjunctions, it turns out that MT and S
0
agree on all problem domains that
can be represented in the languages of both approaches. In denitions 4 and 5 syntactic () and
semantical (

=
) correspondence for S
0
and MT are dened.  has been dened such that causes of
disjunctions cannot occur in corresponding theories.

=
is dened such that M

=
(S; S
0
) if the uents
that hold in S hold in M at time 0 and the uents that hold in S
0
hold in M at time 1. Here is our
equivalence theorem :
Theorem 1 If we have any theory T
c
and any domain description T
mt
= (S;E;C) such that a)
T
c
 T
mt
and b) there is an M j= T
c
with Ab
1
g
(M) = Ab
2
f
(M) = ; then
1. M2 S
0
(T
c
)) Res
4
C
(E; S) = fS
0
g; M

=
(S; S
0
)
2. S
0
2 Res
4
C
(E; S) ) there exists an M with
M2 S
0
(T
c
);M

=
(S; S
0
).
Baral and Gelfond's L
3
and S
0
Baral and Gelfond's (BG) approach [3, 2] which is based on their ADL L
3
, consists of domain
descriptions D written in L
3
. We compared our theories T
c
to domain descriptions D in exactly
the same way as we compared them to theories T
mt
of MT's approach: we will rst give an example
of a reasoning domain where S
0
gives better results than BG's does. We will then dene syntactical
and semantical correspondence relations and provide a theorem stating that, for the subset of possible
reasoning domains for which the syntactical correspondence relation is dened, corresponding theories
have corresponding models. We rst have to explain the basics of BG's approach though:
Review of L
3
Baral and Gelfond's approach consists of domain descriptions D written in a language
L
3
. If a domain description D is consistent, then it has models M which determine what generalized
uents hold at what time. L
3
consists of the sets of symbols F (uents), A (unit actions) and S
(situations). S contains two special situations s
0
and s
N
: the initial and current situation. A uent
literal is a uent possibly preceded by :. By a generalized action a, BG mean a disjunction of arbitrary
sets of unit actions: a = a
1
j : : : ja
m
(m  1); a
i
= fa
i1
; : : : ; a
in
g for 1  i  n. Each a
i
is called
a compound action and interpreted as a set of actions which are performed concurrently and which
start and stop contemporaneously. If a generalized action is performed, this means that one of the
constituent compound actions is performed and it is not known which.
Domain descriptions D in L
3
may contain several kinds of rules. First, there are eect laws of the
form
a causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
n
12
We denote by f a uent literal in a T
c
. Whenever we write f
0
, we mean the corresponding literal
in MT's language: if f = Not(f
00
); f
00
2 FC, then f
0
= :f
00
; otherwise, f
0
= f .
Denition 4 For any T
c
of our approach and T
mt
= (S;E;C) of MT's approach we dene
T
c
 T
mt
(`T
c
corresponds to T
mt
') to be true i all of the following hold:
1. EC = ;; TNC = ;; F
i
2 FC i F
i
is an atom in the propositional language for which T
mt
is dened .
2. T
c
c
ind
consists of axioms (5)-(8) .
3. T
c
contains the axiom Ho(f
1
; 0) ^ : : :Ho(f
jFCj
; 0) i S = (f
0
1
; : : : ; f
0
jFCj
).
Here FC = fF
1
; : : : ; F
jFCj
g; each f
i
stands for either F
i
or Not(F
i
) .
4. T
c
contains an axiom of the form
Ca(f
1
; 1) ^ : : : ^ Ca(f
n
; 1) (n  1)
i E contains formula f
0
1
^ : : :^ f
0
n
. Here each f
i
can stand for any F or Not(F ) with F 2 FC
.
5. T
c
contains an axiom of the form (n  1;m  1)
H(f
1
; : : : ; f
n
; 1)  Ca(f
n+1
; 1) ^ : : : ^ Ca(f
n+m
; 1)
i C contains formula H
0
(f
1
; : : : ; f
n
)) f
0
n+1
^ : : : ^ f
0
n+m
.
Here each f
i
can stand for any F or Not(F ) with F 2 FC. H(f
1
; : : : ; f
n
; 1) is a propositional
combination of uent facts, each of the form Ho(f
i
; 1) with 1  i  n. H
0
(f
1
; : : : ; f
n
) is the
same propositional formula but with each Ho(f
i
; 1) replaced by f
0
i
.
6. All axioms in T
c
are of one of the forms occurring in conditions 2-5 above. All formulas in
E are of the form occurring in condition 4 and all formulas in C are of the form occurring
in condition 5.
Denition 5 Given a model M
C
for a T
c
and a pair of states (S; S
0
) for a T
mt
we say that
M
C
corresponds to (S; S
0
) i for all f 2 FC we have
M
C
j= Ho(f ; 0), f
0
2 S and M
C
j= Ho(f ; 1), f
0
2 S
0
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where a is a compound action and f; p
1
; : : : ; n (n  0) are uent literals. This should be read as `f is
guaranteed to be true after the execution of an action a in any state of the world in which p
1
; : : : ; p
n
are true'.
Second, there are uent facts of the form f at s where f is a uent literal and s is a situation. This
should be read as `f is observed to be true in situation s'.
Third, there are occurrence facts which are expressions of the form  bfoccurs at s where  is a
sequence of generalized actions and s is a situation. This says that `the sequence  of actions was
observed to have occurred in situation s'.
Fourth, there are precedence facts of the form s
1
precedes s
2
. This states that situation s
1
occurred
before s
2
.
The three kinds of facts introduced above are called atomic. A fact is a propositional combination
of atomic facts
1
.
An interpretation M = (	;) for a domain description D contains a `situation assignment'  and
a `causal interpretation' 	.
A situation assignment is a mapping from S to sequences of actions, such that 1) (s
0
) = [] ([]
denotes the empty sequence) and 2) for every s
i
2 S, (s
i
) is a prex of (s
n
). A causal interpretation
	 maps sequences of actions to `states'. A state  is an interpretation of all uents, denoted by the
set of uents that are interpreted to be true.
If an interpretation M is consistent with the description D, it is called a model of D. For a more
detailed denition of modelhood and for illustrating examples we refer to Baral and Gelfond's article
[3].
A Distinguishing Example For most domain descriptions D, the models M for D correspond to the
models S
0
selects for the theory T
c
corresponding to D (Notice again that in L
3
we can only express
a small subset of what is expressible in our language). There is only one class of domains where BG
and S
0
give dierent results, and again we claim that for this class, BG gives the less intuitive ones.
We are talking about domains involving specicity, which can best be illustrated using the following
example: suppose that if you lift a bowl of soup with either your left or your right hand, but not both,
then you spill the soup and the table gets wet. If you lift the bowl with both hands however, then
you do not spill the soup (this is in fact the standard example illustrating the need for `specicity' [3]
{ see below). BG formalize this using the following domain description D:
fLift leftg causes Wet (13)
fLift rightg causes Wet (14)
fLift left;Lift rightg causes :Wet if :Wet (15)
BG then use the rule of specicity in determining the models for their domain description, which says
that `more specic information about actions overrides less specic information': if the preconditions
of (15) hold, then rules (13) and (14) are ignored when determining the eects of Lift left and Lift right.
Now in this simple example BG's approach works well. However, suppose your table is placed in your
garden, where there is also a sprinkler very near to your table, obeying the following additional rule:
Turn on sprinkler causes Wet (16)
Now consider a situation in which your table is dry. If in this situation you lift the soup bowl with
both hands while somebody else turns on the sprinkler, then the result according to BG's approach
is undened: suppose we have the additional facts
:Wet at s
0
^ [fTurn on sprinkler;Lift left;Lift rightg] occurs at s
0
(17)
1
There is one extra kind of rule in L
3
, the hypothesis. Hypotheses however cannot occur in domain descriptions D
and will therefore be of no concern to us.
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In the following, we will sometimes refer to uent literals p which are syntactical objects of the
language L
3
. A uent literal can be any p such that p 2 ff j f 2 Fg [ f:f j f 2 Fg. Whenever
we write p
0
, we will mean a uent literal for our language: p
0
= Not(f) if p = :f; f 2 F ; p
0
= p
otherwise.
Denition 6 For any theory T
c
in our language and domain description D for a language L
3
=
(F ;A;S), we dene T
c
 D ( `T
c
corresponds to D') to hold i all of the following hold:
1. constants 1) a 2 EC i a 2 A; 2)) f 2 FC i f 2 F ; and 3) s 2 TNC i s 2 S.
2. d.i. axioms T
c
c
ind
consists of all domain independent axioms (5)-(8) plus the additional
axiom s
0
= 0.
3. eect laws D contains an expression of the form `fa
1
; : : : ; a
n
g causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
m
' i
T
c
contains the following axiom:
8t : [ Ho(p
0
1
; t) ^ : : : ^ Ho(p
0
m
; t) ^ (BG18)
Ho
ev
(a
1
; t) ^ : : : ^ Ho
ev
(a
n
; t) ]  Ho(f
0
; t+ 1)
Notice that t is an object language variable while the p
0
i
, f
0
and a
i
are meta variables.
4. uent facts D contains an expression of the form `f at s', i T
c
contains the axiom
`Ho(f
0
; s)'.
5.occurrence facts D contains an expression of the form `[a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] occurs at s', where n >
0, a
i
= a
i1
j : : : j a
im
i
, a
ij
= fa
1
ij
; : : : ; a
k(i;j)
ij
g, a
k(i;j)
ij
2 A i T
c
contains the following
axiom:
H(a
11
; s) _ : : : _ H(a
1m
1
; s) _
H(a
21
; s+ 1) _ : : : _ H(a
2m
2
; s+ 1) _
.
.
.
H(a
n1
; s+ n  1) _ : : : _ H(a
nm
n
; s+ n  1) (BG19)
where H(a
ij
; s) is short for Ho
ev
(a
1
ij
; s) ^ : : : ^Ho
ev
(a
k(i;j)
ij
; s).
6. precedence facts D contains an expression of the form `s
1
precedes s
2
', i T
c
contains the axiom `s
1
< s
2
'.
7. facts A fact in L
3
is a propositional combination of the three sorts of `atomic' facts mentioned
above. D contains such a propositional combination i T
c
contains the corresponding propo-
sitional combination of the translations of the constituent atomic facts.
8. closure All axioms in T
c
are either in T
c
c
ind
or a propositional combination of constituents
that can be either of the form (BG18) or of the form Ho(f; s) or of the form (BG19) or of
the form s
1
< s
2
.
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Consider an interpretation M = (	;) of D in L
3
. (s
N
) can be written as a sequence of
compound actions:
(s
n
) = [a
0
; a
1
; : : : ; a
last
]
Notice that for all s occurring in D, (s) is a proper prex of (s
n
) and specically (s
0
) = []. We
now dene A(t) to be the t-th element of (s
N
) for t  last and to be the empty set for t > last.
Similarly, we can write 	((s
N
)) as follows:
	((s
n
)) = [
0
; 
1
; : : : ; 
last
]
We dene F (t) to be the t-th element of 	((s
n
)) for t  last while for t > last, F (t) = F (last).
Denition 7 Suppose that T
c
 D for some T
c
and D. A model M for T
c
corresponds to
a model M of D (written as M

=
M) i the following three conditions hold for all a; f and s
mentioned in D and all t 2 Time Point Symbols (which, on the left hand sides, are interpreted as
plain integers):
1. a 2 A(t),M j= Ho(a; t)
2. f 2 F (t),M j= Ho(f; t)
3. (s) contains exactly t elements ,M j= s = t
Proposition 2 There is no model M for D
0
= D [ (16) [ (17).
Proof: Follows directly from denition 3.7 in [3]. 2
One should stress that there is nothing wrong with `specicity' in itself! From our point of view,
specicity just says that, just as you assume that `no events happen in general' when determining
your set of models, you may already assume it in your specication of eect axioms; we just did not
build in this feature in our current version of S
0
. The real problem lies in the inappropriate use of
causes in (15): there is no cause for not getting wet if you lift the soup bowl with two hands. Again,
our preliminary work (Pearl's semantics) is performed incorrectly, and we arrive at counterintuitive
results.
Because we do not feature specicity, we would have to formalize (13) as
Ho(Lift left; t) ^ :Ho(Lift right; t)  Ho(Wet; t+ 1) (20)
and (14) accordingly. (15) would then simply disappear.
Correspondence and Equivalence If we want to prove equivalence between BG's approach and S
0
,
we rst have to rule out domain descriptions D such as the above which may involve specicity and
which thus may be handled dierently by the two approaches. These are the ambiguous D:
Denition 8 If a domain description D in the language L
3
contains two eect laws
a causes f if p
1
; : : : ; p
n
and
a
0
causes :f if p
0
1
; : : : ; p
0
m
where a \ a
0
6= ; and fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g \ f:p
0
1
; : : : ;:p
0
m
g = ; then D is said to be ambiguous.
The correspondence relations `' and `

=
' are introduced in denitions 6 and 7 In these denitions we
will deviate a little from our usual notation: we will denote tokens for event, uent and time name
constants using regular (non-bold,non-capital) symbols as is done in [2].
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Denition 9 The method M
0
applied to a domain theory T
c
consists of the following steps:
1. Circumscribe Ca in T
c
with Ho (and all other functions and predicates) xed and let the
resulting theory be T
0
c
:
T
0
c
= Circum(T
c
;Ca)
2. Now add the causation and persistence axioms (M21), (M22) and (M23) to T
0
c
thereby ob-
taining a theory T
00
c
.
3. Circumscribe Ab
1
g
, Ab
2
f
and Ab
2
e
in T
00
c
with all other predicates and functions allowed to
vary, giving Ab
1
g
a higher priority than Ab
2
f
and Ab
2
f
a higher priority than Ab
2
e
. Let the
resulting theory be M
0
(T
c
):
M
0
(T
c
) = Circum(T
00
c
;Ab
1
g
> Ab
2
f
> Ab
2
e
; h all other non-logical symbols i)
Theorem 2 If we have any theory T
c
for our language and domain description D for a language
L
3
(D) of Baral and Gelfond's such that a) T
c
 D, b) D is not ambiguous, and c) a modelM j= T
c
with Ab
1
g
(M) = Ab
2
f
(M) = ; exists, then
1. M2 S
0
(T
c
)) there exists a model M for D such that M

=
M .
2. M is a model for D ) there exists an M2 S
0
(T
c
) such that M

=
M .
9.3 Circumscriptive Causal Approaches and M
0
Before we give any more comparisons of S
0
, we will rst rephrase it as an equivalent method M
0
that achieves nonmonotonicity by using circumscription [22, 23]. This will make comparisons to other
circumscriptive approaches such as causal minimization (section 9.4) and Lin's `embrace of causality'
(section 9.5) much easier, as these approaches have a large `surface similarity' to M
0
: just looking at
the denitions of the approaches will show how related to M
0
(and therefore, S
0
) they are.
An additional advantage is that withM
0
we express some of the causal reasoning within our domain
theories themselves, thus implicitly showing that we do not have to do everything semantically (as we
do in S
0
and I
0
).
The Reasoning Method M
0
In the following we assume that our language contains the three additional predicatesAb
1
g
(g; t);Ab
2
f
(f; t)
and Ab
2
e
(e; t). Our theories T
c
are not allowed to mention these three predicates however. In the
denition of M
0
we will use some additional axioms. First, there is a causation axiom:
:Ab
1
g
(g; t)  (Ca(g; t)  Ho(g; t)) (M21)
The following is our persistence axiom part I :
:Ab
2
f
(f; t) 
[:Ca(f; t) ^ :Ca(Not(f); t)]  [Ho(f; t  1)  Ho(f; t)] (M22)
(M22) says that one can prove that a uent persists i one can prove that there is no cause for it to
change. Here is our persistence axiom part II :
:Ab
2
e
(e; t)  [:Ca(e; t)  Ho(Not(e); t)] (M23)
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M
0
is introduced in denition 9 as a circumscriptive two-step procedure (we use the notation of [15]).
To see that this procedure is really almost equivalent to S
0
, one should realize rst that S
0
still selects
the same models if we change it in the following way: we skip its second step and the part of the third
step involving JE. We then replace all occurrences of JE in the denitions of Ab
2
f
and Ab
2
e
(step 4
of S
0
, see
2
denition 2) by the instances of Ho to which they are equivalent. For example, step 2 and
step 3 make JE(f ; t) equivalent to Ho(f ; t  1) for all t > 1. We can thus replace JE(Not(f); t) in the
denition of Ab
2
f
by Ho(Not(f); t   1). The denition of JE in step 2 and 3 of S
0
implies that there
can never be any elements (f ; 0) in Ab
2
f
anyway so the special case t = 0 is of no concern either.
We can replace JE(e; t) analogously. We have now modied S
0
such that it looks dierent but still
selects the same models. Note that the minimization of Ca (step 3 of S
0
) has not been modied. This
minimization is achieved in M
0
by circumscribing Ca with Ho xed : in that way, it is made sure that
no particular extension of Ho is ruled out. After this minimization of Ca, the causation axiom (M21)
is added, giving the predicate Ab
1
g
the same `extension' as we give to the set Ab
1
g
in step 4 of S
0
. The
persistence axiom (M22) does not look too similar to the denition of Ab
2
f
. Indeed, one would rather
expect the following:
:Ab
2
f
(f; t) 
:Ca(f; t)  (Ho(Not(f)); t  1)  Ho(Not(f); t)) (M24)
Interestingly, however, we have the following proposition (the proof of which is trivial):
Proposition 3 [8f; t::Ab
1
g
(f; t) ^ :Ab
2
f
(f; t)]  [ ((M21) ^ (M24)) , ((M21) ^ (M22)) ]
In other words, though (M24) and (M22) are not equivalent, they become equivalent in the presence
of the causation axiom and if additionally, nothing unexpected happens. Considering all this, it
is not surprising that we can prove equivalence between S
0
and M
0
as long as we do not have
any abnormalities. For this, we rst need some more denitions. We rst dene M
1

Ca
M
2
,
M
1

Ab
1
g
M
2
, M
1

Ab
2
f
M
2
and M
1

Ab
2
e
M
2
analogously to M
1

Ho
M
2
(see section 2.3).
This leads us to the following denition:
Denition 10 Suppose M is some class of models for our language extended with predicates Ab
1
g
;Ab
2
f
and Ab
2
e
. We will write `Mc
HCA
2M' as an abbreviation for
9M
0
M
0
2M and M
0

Ho
M and M
0

Ca
M
and M
0

Ab
1
g
M and M
0

Ab
2
f
M and M
0

Ab
2
e
M
and 8g; t : (g; t) 2 Ab
1
g
(M
0
),M
0
j= Ab
1
g
(g; t) g
and 8f ; t : (f ; t) 2 Ab
2
f
(M
0
),M
0
j= Ab
2
f
(f ; t) g
and 8e; t : (e; t) 2 Ab
2
e
(M
0
),M
0
j= Ab
2
e
(e; t) g
We are now ready for our theorem:
Theorem 3 If we have any T
c
for our language extended with Ab
1
g
;Ab
2
f
and Ab
2
e
such that a) T
c
does not mention JE nor any t 2 TNC, and b) There is anM2 S
0
(T
c
) with Ab
1
g
(M) = Ab
2
f
(M) =
;, then we have for all M for our language that
Mc
HCA
2 S
0
(T
c
),Mc
HCA
2 Mod(M
0
(T
c
))
2
We number the steps in S
0
as in I
0
, i.e. we call the rst step of S
0
`step 2'.
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9.4 Haugh, Lifschitz and Rabinov's Causal Minimization
Causal Minimization was introduced independently by Lifschitz [17] and Haugh [11]. We focus on
Lifschitz' and Rabinov's approach [18], in which some of the problems of the two earlier methods are
overcome. Lifschitz and Rabinov (LR) represent time as in the situation calculus [24]. The basic
sort in their logic is a situation, which stands for the state of the world at a particular point in time.
For any situation s, the function Result(a; s) denotes the situation that would result if action a were
performed in s. LR use truth-valued uents; the function Value(f; s) gives the value of uent f in
situation s (thus Value(f; s) = true corresponds to our Ho(f; t).) The predicate Causes(a; f; v) is
used to indicate that action a may, under some conditions, cause uent f to take on value v (true or
false). Success(a; s) is true i all preconditions for action a to actually cause something in situation
s are true. Miracle(f; s) will mean that a miracle (something unexplainable) happened to the uent
f in situation s. We will now quote the two basic domain independent axioms of the approach. We
changed the syntax somewhat to make the axioms easier to understand within our context. The given
formulas are equivalent to the original ones, however. First, there is the Law of Change:
:Miracle(f;Result(a; s)) 
[Success(a; s) ^ Causes(a; f; v)]  Value(f;Result(a; s)) = v (LR25)
Similarly, there is the Law of Inertia:
:Miracle(f;Result(a; s)) 
[:Success(a; s) _ (:Causes(a; f; false) ^ :Causes(a; f;true))] 
Value(f;Result(a; s)) = Value(f; s) (LR26)
In simple theories in which actions do not have any preconditions, we may assume that Success(a; s)
holds for every a and s { we will not go into to the particular way in which preconditions are handled in
LR's approach, as the approach can already go wrong easily in theories without them. The interested
reader may check in [18] that in theories without preconditions Success(a; s) will indeed always be
true.
LR start with theories T
lr
that contain the two axioms above, some other domain-independent
axioms (which are not relevant for the discussion here) and some domain-dependent knowledge. They
then achieve persistence by circumscribing Ca andMiracle in T
lr
with Causes given a higher priority
than Miracle, and Value allowed to vary.
Now compare (LR25) with our causation axiom (M21) and (LR26) with our persistence axiom (M22),
and notice that they are very similar! Clearly, Miracle corresponds to Ab
1
g
and Ab
2
f
, Causes corre-
sponds to Ca and Value to Ho.
A Distinguishing Example If the two basic axioms are so similar, why then do LR and S
0
get
dierent results in so many of the well-known examples of reasoning domains? Before answering this
question, we will introduce a new simple example where things go wrong for LR while M
0
(and thus
S
0
) handle it correctly. Suppose we have a theory T
lr
containing all domain-independent axioms for
LR's approach and the following domain dependent ones:
Causes(Shoot;Alive; false)
Value(Alive; S
0
) = true
Value(Alive; s) = false  Value(Walking; s) = false
Proposition 4 Using Lifschitz' and Rabinov's circumscription, we can now miraculously deduce:
Value(Walking; S
0
) = false ! (LR27)
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Proof: Follows directly from the denitions in [18]. 2
Intuitively, this is because with the law of change (LR25) one can deduce Value(Alive; Result(Shoot; S
0
)) =
false, but as the circumscription of Causes yields :Causes( Shoot;Walking; v), one can then de-
duce (LR27) thru the law of inertia (LR26). There may be something to say for a solution in which
Value(Alive;Result(Shoot; S
0
)) = true: we did not specify the domain constraint in a causal form (any
way, it is impossible to represent causal rules that do not contain actions in Lifschitz and Rabinov's
system); so the constraint may be interpreted as giving an implicit precondition for the Shoot-action
to be successful. But we do not get that solution either.
The reason that things go wrong here is that LR do not realize that, when they circumscribe Causes,
they are in the business of generating causal laws (or constructing a causal graph, if you like). This
generation of laws should of course not have any inuence on what holds when! Only once we know
these laws (the graph) can we use them to decide what should hold when. But in LR's approach,
Value is allowed to vary during the circumscription of Causes and thus possible extensions of Value
(i.e. Ho, in our approach) are spuriously ruled out.
We can see that our `basic principle' and our `preliminary work' are mixed up here: models with
certain uent facts are already ruled out while it has not yet been established whether these uent
facts are explained in these models or not.
9.5 Lin's Embrace of Causality
Lin [19, 20] has recently introduced a new method for reasoning about action that is based on a
version of the situation calculus [24]. In the situation calculus, time is represented by situations s
rather than timepoints. The sort actions corresponds to our event uents; however, in Lin's approach
symbols of the sort are not necessary constants (i.e. they can be n-ary function symbols rather than
only 0-ary). Similarly, uents in situation calculus correspond to our regular uents, and again, Lin
allows uent symbols to be n-ary. For any action e and situation s, the function Do(e; s) stands for the
situation that results when performing e in s. Ordinary situation calculus contains only the functions
described above and the predicate Ho, dened on uent-situation pairs. In addition to this, Lin uses
two additional predicates Ca and Poss.
It turns out that Lin's method is very similar to ours
3
. Lin's Ca-predicate is ternary: Ca(f; v; s) is
true if the uent f is caused to have the truth value v in situation s. On page 20 we give a (somewhat
extended) quote of [20] which describes the method: The last step of Lin's method is meant to deal
with the qualication problem which we do not address in this paper, so it will be of no concern to
us. We now rst need the following:
Proposition 5 If we exchange step 1 and step 2 in Lin's procedure on page 20 we will arrive at an
equivalent nal theory T
000
lin
.
Proof: If we rewrite (L28) and (L29) as disjunctions, then Ca appears only in negated form in them.
It then easily follows from the model-theoretic characterization of circumscription [15] that the theory
obtained by adding (L28) and (L29) before the circumscription has the same models as the theory
obtained by adding them after the circumscription. 2
But with step 1 and step 2 interchanged and step 4 left out, Lin's approach starts to look suspi-
ciously similar to M
0
! While S
0
and M
0
do not handle the qualication problem, Lin's approach
does not handle failure of causation and unexpected breaches of persistence (i.e. it has no abnormal-
ity predicates). Neither can it represent concurrent events and events causing other events to take
place. Otherwise, as is hopefully clear from just looking at the respective denitions, Lin's approach
is almost identical to S
0
. Though we have not proven it formally, we conjecture the two approaches
to be equivalent on the set of reasoning domains where both are dened.
3
We should add here that a large part of Lin's papers is about restricted variants of his approach which are compu-
tationally tractable. We do not restrict ourselves to these variants here.
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Lin's Procedure Start with a theory T
lin
that consists of unique names axioms, all domain-
dependent axioms and no further axioms.
1. Add the following basic axioms for the predicate Ca to T
lin
:
Ca(f;true; s)  Ho(f; s) (L28)
Ca(f; false; s)  :Ho(f; s) (L29)
2. Circumscribe Ca in T
lin
with all other predicates xed. Let T
0
lin
be the resulting theory.
3. Add to T
0
lin
the following frame axiom and let T
00
lin
be the resulting theory.
Poss(a; s)  f(:Ca(f;true;Do(a; s)) ^ :Ca(f; false;Do(a; s))) 
[Ho(f;Do(a; s))  Ho(f; s)]g (L30)
4. Maximize Poss in T
00
lin
to obtain the nal theory T
000
lin
.
We end this section with the following very important remark. From the point of view of our phi-
losophy, one should add causation and persistence axioms only after circumscribing Ca. Remember
that we interpret the circumscription/minimization of Ca in a T
c
as a step in the determination
of a causal graph belonging to T
c
. The causation and persistence axioms are meant to infer what
holds and what does not using an already existing causal graph, i.e. an existing full extension of Ca.
Clearly, we should not be using these axioms to determine the extensions of Ca themselves!
Now because Ca appears only negatively in the causation axioms, nothing changes in practice if one
adds them before circumscribing Ca. However if one adds the persistence axiom before, both Lin's
and our method would break down: for example, in a model with Ho(Alive; t) and :Ho(Alive; t + 1)
and :Ab
2
f
(Alive; t+1) we would automatically infer Ca(Not(Alive); t+1) , thus introducing a spurious
sucient cause.
Interestingly, in Lin's papers neither the choice to keep Ho xed during circumscription of Ca, nor
the choice to add the persistence axiom only after this rst circumscription is motivated in terms
other than `if you do not do it, you get counterintuitive results'. Causal network theory thus provides
an external motivation for these choices.
10. I
0
and the others
We will now see that two popular non-causal approaches, namely Baker's [1] and `Chronological
Minimization' [13, 30] can be reinterpreted as an approximation of I
0
- specically, these approaches
try to generate the sucient causes within their models, but sometimes fail to do so { so once again,
our `preliminary work' is not done well. While our comparison to chronological minimization remains
completely informal, in Baker's case we again provide an equivalence theorem and a counterexample.
10.1 I
0
and Baker
Baker's approach is based on the situation calculus [24] where time is represented by situations s
rather than timepoints; there still is a nite set of regular uent constants FC and of events EC, but
Ho is now dened only for regular uents f and situations s. For any e and s, Result(e; s) stands
for the situation that results when performing e in s. Theories T
b
for Baker's approach all contain
domain independent axioms (5), (6) (with g replaced by f and t by s) and (8). Furthermore they
21
contain the uent domain-closure axiom (31) and the frame axiom (32) :
f = F
1
_ : : : _ F
jFCj
(31)
:Ab(f; e; s)  (Ho(f;Result(a; s))  Ho(f; s)) (32)
Finally, there are existence of situations (`EOS') axioms (the precise form of which is given in def. 11,
page 23) that make sure that for each set of uents F  FC there is at least one situation in which
they hold. Baker's method consists of circumscribing [22] the Ab-predicate in a T
b
with Ho xed
and Result allowed to vary. Roughly, this means that we select those models of T
b
in which we
have Ab(f; e; s) (and thus, by (32), no persistence) only if f is forced to take on another value if e is
performed in s.
It now turns out that we can reinterpret Ab(f; e; s) as saying `e is a sucient cause for f in situation
s'; similarly, circumscribing Ab is very similar to the inference of s   causes in step 1 of I
0
. To see
this, one should realize that in the absence of any sucient cause for a uent f to take on a specic
value at time t, we have persistence in all our preferred models: Ho(f ; t)  Ho(f ; t 1). It now follows
that if in a preferred model we have a change of uent value from time t  1 to t, this means we must
also have a sucient cause in our model for the uent to take on a specic value at time t. Now
notice that we have Ab(f; e; s) only if there is an event e, that, when performed in circumstances s,
brings about a change in the value of f , i.e. the event e generates a sucient cause for f !
The EOS- axioms can now be interpreted as making sure that, in determining the instances of Ab,
one looks at all possible situations, including counterfactual ones in which the contingent observations
do not hold! But EOS only creates counterfactual situations for all possible combinations of regular
uent values, while step 1 of I
0
takes into account all counterfactual models consistent with the
eect axioms. This means that in Baker's approach, contingent observations can sometimes still
inuence the sucient causes found. We illustrate this by an example that shows that in counterfactual
situations/models a) one also needs to include event uents; b) one also has to consider timepoints
earlier than the time at which an action is performed.
Example We now feature a variation of the YSP, in which a new action Point is introduced: we
suppose that if we Shoot, we have to Point rst in order not to miss. We formalize this in a theory
T
b-point
for Baker's approach, containing axioms (5),(6),(8) & (31)-(34) :
Ho(Loaded;Result(Point; s))  [ :Ho(Alive;Result(Shoot;Result(Point; s))) ] (33)
Ho(Alive; S
0
) ^ Ho(Loaded; S
0
) (34)
Suppose s = Result(Shoot;Result(Point; S
0
)).
Proposition 6 Baker's procedure does not prefer models for T
b-point
with :Ho(Alive; s) over mod-
els with Ho(Alive; s).
Proof: It is easy to show by the technique used in [1] that this is because no counterfactual situation
exists in which the Point-action does not take place. 2
Note also that in a non-causal theory T
nc-point
that encodes the same domain knowledge, the
problem does not occur: step 1 of I
0
will make sure that any model M with M j= Ho(Loaded; t) ^
Ho(Point; t   1) ^ Ho(Shoot; t) will also have Ca(Not(Alive); t + 1), and thus this M will only be
selected in step 5 of I
0
if it also has Ho(Not(Alive; t+ 1).
All other problems with Baker's approach we are aware of, like the `extended stolen car problem',
the `two-tank problem' [4] and the general problem of handling actions with nondeterministic eects
[12] can be seen to stem from either the narrow denition of counterfactual situations or from the fact
that Baker uses a single predicate Ab to denote both causation (our Ca) and surprise (our Ab
1
g
and
Ab
2
f
).
If one restricts I
0
such that our `circumstances' (in def.3) coincide with Baker's `situations', and
furthermore one allows only theories for which there are models without surprises about regular uents,
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then the two methods become the same! Formally, we dene I
b
0
to be the same as I
0
except that a) in
denition 3,  must only contain uent facts of the form Ho(f ; t

), and b), step 5.3 is changed such
that only models in which exactly one event happens at a time are selected.
In def. 11 we dene T
nc
 T
b
to hold for theories T
nc
of our approach and theories T
b
of
Baker's approach which intuitively encode the same domain knowledge. The class of T
nc
for which
T
nc
 T
b
is dened seems rather restricted; still, most specic examples of reasoning problems
given in the literature on Baker's approach t in this format. We want to prove that Baker's method
and I
b
0
select the same models in terms of what holds at what time. However, one model for a theory
in situation calculus corresponds to a whole set of models in our language, namely, one specic model
for each possible sequence of events. We call such a set of models a `branching time (b.t.) model set'
(def.12). In def.13 we dene semantical correspondence: M
b

=
M
bt
for models M
b
2 Mod(T
b
)
and b.t. model sets M
bt
 Mod(T
nc
) will hold i M
b
models exactly the same uent histories as
the elements of M
bt
.
Theorem 4 If we have any T
nc
and T
b
such that a) T
nc
 T
b
, and b) there is a b.t. model set
M
bt
 I
b
0
(T
nc
) with for all M
nc
2M
bt
, Ab
2
f
(M
nc
) = ; then for all M
b
and M
bt
:
1. Baker's procedure selects M
b
) There exists an M
bt
with M
bt

=
M
b
and M
bt
 I
b
0
(T
nc
) .
2. M
bt
 I
b
0
(T
nc
) ) There exists an M
b
preferred by Baker's procedure with M
bt

=
M
b
.
10.2 I
0
and Chronological Minimization
In chronological minimization [30, 13] (CM) one selects a model with a change of uent value at time
t only if there is no model which is the same (in terms of uent facts) up until time t but in which no
uent changes value at time t. Again, this can be reinterpreted as approximating step 1 of I
0
. To see
this, note that it is equivalent to
selecting a model M with a change of uent value at time t only if that change is forced
to happen, given the fact that the past cannot be altered by any event.
Here `forced' means that there are no models in which the same event(s) take(s) place at time t while
the change at t does not take place, but which are the same in terms of Ho up until time t. Now in
the absence of any sucient cause for a uent to take on another value at time t, the uent value
will persist preferred models. This means that the uent will only change value if there is a sucient
cause for it. Thus selecting a model with a change of uent value f at t only if the change is forced to
happen can be seen as trying to nd the models where there is either persistence of f or a sucient
cause for f to take on another value, and this is already quite similar to I
0
. The condition above that
`the past cannot be altered by any event' embodies the same physical assumption as the one we make
in step 4 of denition 3.
It should then come as no surprise that CM does not work very well unless enhanced by lter
preferential entailment [29] which modies CM by rst removing all regular uent facts from a theory,
then performing CM on the models of this `general' theory and only then further select those models
in which the regular uent facts hold .
11. Conclusion and Discussion
From all the above we conclude that our work unies many dierent approaches to nonmonotonic
temporal reasoning. We end this paper by addressing two more or less philosophical issues that this
conclusion raises: a new view on events and on the assessment of the validity of existing theories .
11.1 Events and Explanations
To us, nonmonotonic model selection is simply a search for the models in which as much as possible
is explained. Such models typically contain chains of explanations: A is explained by B, B by C,
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We call a vector
~
f = (f
1
; : : : ; f
jFCj
) where each f
i
2 fF
i
;Not(F
i
)g) a full uent vector. We
abbreviate
`Ho(f
1
; t) ^ : : : ^ Ho(f
jFCj
)' to `Ho(
~
f ; t)' .
Denition 11 For any two theories T
nc
for our language and T
b
for a language of Baker's
approach, we dene T
nc
 T
b
to hold i all of the following hold:
1. The two languages share the same FC and EC .
2. T
nc
c
ind
consists of all domain independent axioms (5)-(8). T
b
contains axioms
(5),(6),(8),(31),(32) .
3. T
nc
c
gen
contains an axiom of form
Ho(f
1
; t) ^ : : :Ho(f
n
; t) ^ Ho(e; t)  Ho(f
r
; t+ 1)
i T
b
contains the axiom
Ho(f
1
; s) ^ : : :Ho(f
n
; s)  Ho(f
r
;Result(e; s)) (B0)
4. T
nc
c
gen
contains an axiom of form
Ho(f ; t)  Ho(f
0
; t) (B1)
i T
b
contains the same axiom (where t is taken to be a situation constant) .
5. T
b
contains a propositional combination of uent facts, each of the form Ho(f ; s), with
s = Result(e
t
;Result(e
t 1
; : : : ;Result(e
0
; S
0
) : : :))
i T
nc
contains the corresponding propositional combination where each Ho(f ; s) is replaced
by [Ho(e
0
; 0) ^ : : : ^ Ho(e
t
; t)  Ho(f ; t+ 1)] .
6. T
b
contains existence of situations-axioms of the form 9sHo(
~
f ; s) for all
~
f whose existence
is consistent with all axioms in T
b
of the form (B0) and (B1) (i.e. Ho(
~
f ; s) 6` :(
V
(B0) ^
V
(B1) )).
7. Each axiom in T
b
is of one of the forms occurring in conditions 2-6 above. Each axiom in
T
nc
is of one of the forms occurring in conditions 2-5 above.
: : : but these chains have to stop somewhere. In our view, `events' are just those things that we are
willing to accept as the end of a chain of explanations. Even for an event we might prefer models
where it is explained by some other event (see the example in section 9.1); but usually, in the common
sense world, an event that takes place without a cause (like Shoot in the models for T
ysp-c
) is less
surprising than a uent that takes on a value without a cause (e.g. Alive becoming Not(Alive) without
a Shoot). In some contexts we might not even want to look for an explanation of the events that are
known to take place { for example, if we perform them ourselves. In such a case, we would rather
speak of `actions' than `events' and model knowledge about them rather as Ca(e; t) than Ho(e; t).
11.2 Validity
How can we assess the validity of our approach? We have proven equivalences between our approach
and ADL{ones. Actually, such approaches were partially developed as a touchstone for other, intu-
itively less clear ones: if one could prove those equivalent to an ADL{approach, then this would show
that they are correct, in a certain sense. We have given such proofs here, but on the other hand, we
have shown that even the ADL-approaches can sometimes give counterintuitive results.
What does this say about the status of either our approach or the ADL-approaches? We will end this
paper by trying to answer this question, thereby implicitly providing a view on applied nonmonotonic
reasoning in general, not just in the temporal domain.
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In the following Ho!(e; t) will be an abbreviation for Ho(e; t) ^
h
V
1ijECj;E
i
6=e
:Ho(E
i
; t)
i
.
Denition 12 A branching time (b.t.) model set M
bt
is any set of models for a theory T
nc
such
that :
1. For all nite sequences of events [e
0
; : : : ; e
t
] (t  0)
 M
bt
contains an M with
M j= Ho!(e
0
; 0) ^ : : : ^ Ho!(e
t
; t).
 There is a sequence of full uent vectors [
~
f
0
; : : :
~
f
t+1
] such that for all M in M
bt
:
M j=
h
V
0it
Ho!(e
i
; i)
i

h
V
0it+1
Ho(
~
f
i
; i)
i
2. For all M in M
bt
, M j= 8t9e : Ho!(e; t)
Denition 13 Given an M
b
for a T
b
and a b.t. model set M
bt
of models for a T
nc
with
T
nc
 T
b
we write M
b

=
M
bt
i for all nite sequences of events [e
0
; : : : ; e
t
] (t  0) and for
all f :
M
b
j= Ho(f ;Result(e
t
; : : : ;Result(e
0
; S
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11.3 The Strange Loop in Applied Nonmonotonic Reasoning
In applied nonmonotonic reasoning, we want to express knowledge we have about the `physics' of
some reasoning domain in a set of axioms and some nonmonotonic formalism. The axioms and the
formalism are always precisely dened, but our `translation step' from common-sense knowledge (as
represented in natural language) to its axiomatic representation certainly is not.
Now over the last ten years, we have seen the following circular pattern in applied nonmonotonic
temporal reasoning:
1. A simple formalization of domain knowledge into axioms of a logical theory is proposed. A
nonmonotonic reasoning mechanism is provided along with it. The reasoning mechanism gives
the right inferences on all or most examples of reasoning domains that have been considered in
the literature so far.
2. Somebody comes up with a counterexample: a simple reasoning domain for which the proposed
axiomatization+reasoning mechanism leads to the inference of unexpected, surprising results.
3. In reaction to this, somebody proposes a new axiomatization+inference mechanism. The pro-
cedure is re-entered at step 1.
The hope seems to have been that, by repeating this procedure over and over again, we would one day
end up with a theory of NMTR that would really work well. But after a few years, people started to
realize that this method does not lead to much progress, and the new paradigm of ADL-languages was
introduced: the idea was to formalize the physics of a domain using sentences in some formal language
and provide a simple semantics for the language. The language should be dened such as to enable
a clear semantics, one for which it is intuitively clear that it really corresponds to the common-sense
world. Other, intuitively less clear approaches could then be validated by proving that they lead to
the same inferences as an existing ADL-based approach.
But our work makes clear that ADL approaches do not escape from the strange loop either! Once
action description languages become rich enough to admit descriptions of complex reasoning domains,
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their semantics may again lead to unintuitive inferences, as is clearly shown in this paper! (section 9.2
gives two examples of reasoning domains where ADL-approaches lead to the wrong conclusions) Again,
one is tempted to patch up a faulty ADL-approach and reenter the loop at step 1.
Our Paradigm Now take a look at step 2 of the loop again: the proposed approaches suer from
unexpected, surprising conclusions. Now what if we take a meta-level stance and formalize this notion
of `unexpectedness' or `surprise' explicitly? Indeed, this is exactly what we do in this paper, as stated
by our `basic principle' (section 3): we want to know for every contingent fact in every model whether
it is explained (= expected, = not-surprising) or not, given the rest of the model.
Indeed, wasn't the original purpose of nonmonotonic reasoning to end up with the conclusions that
normally hold, that we expect, that do not surprise us? So why not formalize domain knowledge in
these terms in the rst place? (!!!)
One may ask what kind of new nonmonotonic principle this will lead to. Actually, if one thinks
about it carefully, this approach is not so new after all: it is essentially probabilistic.
Statements like `if we have fact A in a model, this means that B is also explained in the model',
can be interpreted as statements about conditional probabilities
P (BjA) = 1   (35)
where  is some small number
4
. In this way, we can translate all our qualitative statements about
explanations into statements about probabilities. The set of probability statements that results de-
nes a probability distribution on all models of our theory; selecting models with the least nr. of
abnormalities then amounts to selecting the model with the highest probability.
...but wait a minute? What about al these arguments that probability theory should not be used in
default reasoning because of the inherent complexity of probabilistic inference? And isn't it the case
that statements like (35) above only partially specify a probability distribution?
Both questions have a single answer: probabilistic inference is complex, and probabilities on models
indeed are only partially specied by statements like (35) unless... one uses conditional independence,
the fundamental idea behind Bayesian Networks and other graphical statistical models [14]. Here,
one assumes that all facts A and B for which no statement of the form (35) can be deduced, are
independent: knowing A does not change the probability of B and vice versa, i.e. P (BjA) = P (B)
and P (AjB) = P (A). With this additional assumption, we do end up with a single probability
distribution over all models. In I
0
and S
0
, the conditional independence assumption is enforced by
the domain closure that is performed in step 3.
We thus end this paper, somewhat provocatively, by stating a conviction that we have gradually
adopted while trying to make sense of all the existing approaches to NMTR: if one is to apply non-
monotonic reasoning in the real world, using a formalism compatible with probability theory may be
inevitable if one wants to escape from the `strange loop' that has plagued NMTR for so long.
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